Go re-read drops 1-25 or so, then read the 30 page PDF this link takes you to...
(digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu)
Comments (9)
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https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence_Support_Activity#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20Army%20Intelligence,originally%20subordinated%20to%20the%20US
I think it was a retired General named Paul Vallely. Not 100% on that though. He was doing a radio or online interview of some sort.
Just did. What’s your point?
If you did, you must be dense. MI infiltrating domestic groups. 11-3 starts action.
Yeah I’m not seeing that from just reading page 30. I’m guessing you read the whole thing and gathered that. I read page 30 as you suggested and that is not there.
I said read the 30 page PDF, not 'read page 30 of the PDF'.
https://www.brunswickgroup.com/admiral-mike-rogers-usn-ret-joins-brunswick-as-a-senior-advisor-on-cybersecurity-technology-geopolitical-and-crisis-issues-i11738/
There is nothing "light and transient" about the threat of another terrorist attack, of course. Maybe an adjustment in our thinking about the appropriate domestic role of military intelligence is needed. If so, it should follow a determination that strengthening and refining the civilian intelligence agencies will not accomplish the same purpose. We should also be satisfied that the Department of Homeland Security's IAIP or TTIC could not furnish all the data needed for domestic military operations. Any such adjustment should be the product of a robust public debate, probably culminating in legislation. If we do accept such a change, we must also adopt reliable controls and measures to provide accountability. We might, for example, want to require the approval of a neutral magistrate, say one specially trained in security matters, for military investigations where a Title III warrant or FISA order would not be required. We might want to strictly limit the dissemination of military intelligence information based on particular defined needs, or to limit the acquisition of data by military intelligence components to matters bearing directly on homeland defense. And we might require a periodic review of such data in military intelligence agency files in order to expunge whatever is not accurate and currently relevant to the agency's mission. Finally, we ought to have some clear idea about when we can expect to abandon these changes and return to earlier understandings. Even if no important changes are adopted, we urgently need to clarify our current understandings about how military intelligence activities at home should affect the balance between security and liberty. A recent Congressional Research Service report argues that the "main stumbling block" to better coordination and response between the FBI and the military is the "numerous and often confusing statutory and regulatory authorities that govern the use of the military in a domestic situation." ' ' Clarifying these authorities, it says, could allow a more effective use of military forces while ensuring respect for civil liberties and law enforcement concerns. 72 The same could be said for almost every law, directive, executive order, and regulation touching the domestic work of military intelligence. If we fail to clearly articulate and harmonize these various authorities we will be more vulnerable than we need to be to another terrorist attack. We will also invite well-meaning compromises to some of our most treasured American values.