Nerdpedes,
have a look at
https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/64915/what-are-the-biggest-security-concerns-on-pxe
Best of:
I can capture a full machine image. Do your systems automatically connect to the domain controller after setting up the machine? If so, this image probably has domain controller credentials on it, that I can capture and use elsewhere.
Computer makes a DHCP request --> DHCP server responds with address and PXE parameters --> Computer downloads boot image using TFTP over UDP
If the good guys got the traffic on that low level, unencrypted. Then they would have it all.
The PXE boot plus the remote IDRAC is a terrible combination. . A remote Idrac connection allows them to setup a virtual console, provision a file share over the network as a local disk, or change the BIOS boot order to include a network boot.
A virtual console would allow someone on the network to come in and have keyboard and mouse access to these machines. Database management tools capable of altering the database were found on the machines. This would allow people to come in and basically alter the results the voting machines provided at will.
Provisioning a network share as a local disk. This would allow someone to point to any files they had prepared, and have them accessible. These could log altering to alter the logs on the machines to cover their tracks or any other scenario.
Change the Bios Boot Order to include a network boot. This is perhaps the most subtle and insidious using this could tell the machines to boot and run DIRTY during the election, but after the election they would run the CLEAN version from the disk.
Technical explanation of that 3rd really insidious one. Transfering an OS over the network is data intensive, but there are Minimal OS's designed to run other OS in a containerized fashion. Meaning that instead of booting the CLEAN OS on the disk, they boot a container OS configured to run the OS and Applications on the Disk, but with very subtle variations that the OS would be unaware of. Here is one Scenario
The thing about this is that PXE booting requires DHCP and BOOTP, which have a high probability of hitting the router and being logged by DHCP forwarding configured on the router. Worse yet if the PXE server was configured by someone with access the routers they could simply change the normal forwading address to the rogue server they setup. In this case the evidence would be on the router and network logs at the county, instead of on the Machines. Kindof an Odd coincidence that the county is fighting tooth and nail not to turn these over.