ANSWER: Not for a very long time.

In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which held that, if a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, a court must defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of the statute, even if the court would have construed the statute differently. Loper Bright instead held that “[c]ourts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.” No. 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *61-62 (June 28, 2024). The Court preemptively opined that Chevron’s overruling does not undermine the respect that precedents applying Chevron are entitled to under the doctrine of stare decisis. This explicit admonition will likely be followed by courts in most circumstances. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. United States, 361 F.3d 1378, 1385 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Notably, even if dicta, we would feel obligated to follow the Supreme Court's explicit and carefully considered statements . . . .”).

Going forward, Loper Bright will clearly alter the formal manner in which U.S. Courts adjudicate cases involving the interpretation of and Agencies statutes. An Agency’s interpretation of the statutes it implements will no longer receive the sort of broad deference Chevron afforded. Instead, arguments will be considered for their persuasive value in accordance with Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944) (considering an agency’s interpretation of a statute based upon “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).

The practical effect of Chevron’s demise will vary depending on the specifics of every case. As the Court observed in Loper Bright, the question of deference under Chevron was not even reached unless a court determined that the statute was ambiguous with respect to a certain issue, and individual judges answered the ambiguity question in very different ways. 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *55 (“Ambiguity is a term that may have different meanings for different judges. One judge might see ambiguity everywhere; another might never encounter it.” (cleaned up)). Thus, even while Chevron was on the books, a court could avoid deferring to an agency interpretation if the court could discern a clear answer to the statutory question.

Yet whatever the effects going forward, the Loper Bright Court was explicit that the overruling of Chevron should not upset the stare decisis value of past judicial decisions applying Chevron:

"By doing so, however, we do not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 457 (2008). Mere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute a “‘special justification’” for overruling such a holding, because to say a precedent relied on Chevron is, at best, “just an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014)(quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000)). That is not enough to justify overruling a statutory precedent.2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *60-61.

This passage will be a critical source of authority for an Agency in arguing that previously settled statutory interpretations should not be revisited or upset simply because those interpretations relied on Chevron. It would be difficult for courts to evade Loper Bright’s admonition on this point.

But there is still a risk that courts could purport to discern exceptions to that admonition in particular cases. As the Loper Bright dissent observed: “Courts motivated to overrule an old Chevron-based decision can always come up with something to label a ‘special justification.’ Maybe a court will say ‘the quality of the precedent’s reasoning’ was poor. Or maybe the court will discover something ‘unworkable’ in the decision—like some exception that has to be applied.” 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2882, at *153 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (cleaned up).

Chevron’s overruling is most likely to tempt courts to revisit precedent that applied Chevron’s framework in circumstances where (1) there was disagreement among judges about whether the statute was silent or ambiguous on a particular issue; and (2) the decision of the court, even if unanimous, expressed doubt that the agency’s interpretation was the best one or opined that the court would have interpreted the statute differently but for Chevron.

In sum, although Loper Bright overruled Chevron, the Court attempted to preempt use of the overruling as a basis to revisit settled precedent applying Chevron. The Court’s admonition provides clear language that an Agency should invoke as appropriate, and with which courts are generally likely to abide. But there is still a risk that courts will revisit previously settled statutory questions in circumstances where Chevron’s application was controversial.