I think they're missing the point on strategy, but everyone has an opinion. I'm also not convinced the world knows everything about our stockpiles of weapons.

https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/What-Beijing-Is-Learning-From-Operation-Epic-Fury.html

Some excerpts from the article:

Operation Epic Fury, launched Feb. 28, has given China’s military planners an unprecedented real-time window into how the United States wages high-end warfare, according to Mick Ryan, a retired Australian major general and senior fellow at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. “The US military is still a very powerful organization,” Ryan told RFE/RL this week. “It can deploy overwhelming force and conduct sustained precision operations, at least from the air and from the sea.”

That part is not reassuring to Beijing. But the fuller picture is more complicated, and potentially more useful to Chinese planners.

Ryan says the Trump administration has demonstrated a critical limitation alongside its firepower: it can manage one major war at a time, and it has stripped out much of the institutional decision-making architecture that would normally govern a conflict of this scale. “These decisions look to be being made much more on impulse,” Ryan said, pointing to what he described as shifting and inconsistent strategic objectives since the campaign began.

For Xi Jinping and the People’s Liberation Army, that combination — overwhelming capability paired with constrained strategic bandwidth — is worth studying carefully. If Beijing has a clearer strategy than Washington does, Ryan argues, that gap matters as much as any hardware comparison. “Strategy is even more important than battlefield performance,” he said. “Having the right strategic assumptions and the right strategic decision mechanisms for executing that strategy is something the Chinese might think that they’re better at than the United States at the moment.”

The strategic implications extend well beyond tactics. China receives roughly a third of its crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The closure has forced Beijing to scramble for Russian and alternative supplies even as it publicly opposes the war and calls for de-escalation. Iran, notably, granted Chinese-flagged vessels passage through the strait on March 26, a gesture that underscored the careful line Beijing is walking: rhetorical opposition to Washington, functional diplomacy with Tehran, and eyes fixed on the Taiwan question.

One of the more alarming data points for Western defense planners is the pace of US missile interceptor depletion. American and allied forces have expended an estimated 2,000 interceptors in the campaign so far, and production rates are nowhere near sufficient to replenish them quickly.

Ryan is more cautious about the immediacy of that threat. Trump’s unpredictability, while analytically frustrating for Beijing, is also a genuine deterrent. Unlike any of his predecessors, Trump cannot be reliably war-gamed. “The Chinese can’t really war game what his reaction to any kind of event might be because he just really is all over the place,” Ryan said. That uncertainty, he argues, probably induces caution in Xi.