Here's a snippet with a link to the article below which provides a lot more detail.
Venezuela’s oil rebound is not simply a production story. It is a story about sanctions licenses, naphtha, rig reactivation, tanker access, refinery fit, insurance, payment clearance, and legal confidence.
The United States does not need to own the oilfield to influence the barrel. It can influence the contract, the bank, the insurer, the payment path, the vessel, the counterparty, the jurisdiction, and the conditions under which proceeds become usable.
That is the real petrodollar. Not a mythic treaty in a vault. Not a single Saudi bargain. Not a conspiracy theory about denomination. The petrodollar is the dollar-centered operating system around energy trade: correspondent banking, marine insurance, sanctions compliance, letters of credit, dispute resolution, vessel screening, cargo documentation, and payment finality.
I've puzzled over that drop for a while. Many have speculated that some won't make it to the end, or that they won't benefit from the end of the DS. But after being around liberals for a long time, and some crazy ones at that, I wonder if maybe it's a simple statement that some people are going to be really angry to see some people thrive after the DS is removed.
I recall one particular person who didn't think it was fair that anyone should have more than her, or be better off than her, even if they worked hard for it, and she wasn't afraid to say it out loud. She was convinced communism would be much better for the country. And some of the comments I've heard from other more reasonable liberals over the years sound remarkably similar in retrospect when you see the pattern of comments.
I'm interested what anyone else thinks about The End Won't be for Everyone
I think they're missing the point on strategy, but everyone has an opinion. I'm also not convinced the world knows everything about our stockpiles of weapons.
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/What-Beijing-Is-Learning-From-Operation-Epic-Fury.html
Some excerpts from the article:
Operation Epic Fury, launched Feb. 28, has given China’s military planners an unprecedented real-time window into how the United States wages high-end warfare, according to Mick Ryan, a retired Australian major general and senior fellow at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. “The US military is still a very powerful organization,” Ryan told RFE/RL this week. “It can deploy overwhelming force and conduct sustained precision operations, at least from the air and from the sea.”
That part is not reassuring to Beijing. But the fuller picture is more complicated, and potentially more useful to Chinese planners.
Ryan says the Trump administration has demonstrated a critical limitation alongside its firepower: it can manage one major war at a time, and it has stripped out much of the institutional decision-making architecture that would normally govern a conflict of this scale. “These decisions look to be being made much more on impulse,” Ryan said, pointing to what he described as shifting and inconsistent strategic objectives since the campaign began.
For Xi Jinping and the People’s Liberation Army, that combination — overwhelming capability paired with constrained strategic bandwidth — is worth studying carefully. If Beijing has a clearer strategy than Washington does, Ryan argues, that gap matters as much as any hardware comparison. “Strategy is even more important than battlefield performance,” he said. “Having the right strategic assumptions and the right strategic decision mechanisms for executing that strategy is something the Chinese might think that they’re better at than the United States at the moment.”
The strategic implications extend well beyond tactics. China receives roughly a third of its crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The closure has forced Beijing to scramble for Russian and alternative supplies even as it publicly opposes the war and calls for de-escalation. Iran, notably, granted Chinese-flagged vessels passage through the strait on March 26, a gesture that underscored the careful line Beijing is walking: rhetorical opposition to Washington, functional diplomacy with Tehran, and eyes fixed on the Taiwan question.
One of the more alarming data points for Western defense planners is the pace of US missile interceptor depletion. American and allied forces have expended an estimated 2,000 interceptors in the campaign so far, and production rates are nowhere near sufficient to replenish them quickly.
Ryan is more cautious about the immediacy of that threat. Trump’s unpredictability, while analytically frustrating for Beijing, is also a genuine deterrent. Unlike any of his predecessors, Trump cannot be reliably war-gamed. “The Chinese can’t really war game what his reaction to any kind of event might be because he just really is all over the place,” Ryan said. That uncertainty, he argues, probably induces caution in Xi.
And a couple other nuggets. Less than 10 minutes - no fluff
Just thinking about size and extent of the fraud exposure in Minnesota and how many assume / know it's much greater in states like CA and NY. People are talking about it and beginning to figure out it's affecting them personally even if the MSM isn't doing a very good job of pointing it out.
Along with MSM coverage of ICE and illegals, and MSM coverage of governors opposing the arrest of criminals and failing to quell riots - exposing the infiltration.
We know the judicial system is broken, and Congress and The Senate are compromised, so they aren't going to be any help until they get flushed out.
I do hope things begin to accelerate from here.
