W. Rodgers - No more machines. Paper ballots only. Encrypted water marks. Copy-paper proof only
(media.greatawakening.win)
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Yes, yes, & yes. Welcome back secure elections. Let's add voter ID to the mix.
I used to believe in technological solutions until 2020. Not anymore.. The paper trail is the only thing that can't easily be faked.
I'm a computer guy. There are ways to have a secure election that uses computers(at least partially), but the powers that be will not allow that sort of thing to ever see the light of day. Until these lunatics are thrown out of power we have to go backwards to go forward later.
I used to think that too (I am also a computer guy). But it is very difficult to have every layer of the stack including hardware be verifiable. And while paper is a pain in the ass it's also just a lot more difficult to hack. Many of Jovan's methods rely on analyzing the unintentional corroborating redundancies like paper folds or scribble styles, that are virtually impossible to make line up when you're faking it. Digital techniques are always about eliminating unintentional redundancy, by representing artifacts in a more succinct digital format. Sure you can add in digital signatures etc but there are always ways around these things through the "real world" - like how social engineering, not cryptography, is usually the weak point in a digital security architecture.
I'm thinking hand marked paper ballots, kept in a sealed box with multiple observers. Why try to optimize this process further?
For the counting, I don't see why hand counting is out of the question, if it's done in a distributed fashion. An initial hand count at the precinct level followed by a machine scan and publish the scans and tallies.
All candidates can bring in their own machines to examine the paper, or download and analyze the scans, and reconcile differences.
I don't have it all worked out, but any black box is a huge risk and keeping the paper is the only reason we have any hope of sorting out 2020. (Even so in 2020 there are a lot of "ballot marking devices" in use, and who knows if they did what the voter intended. Those have got to go except for people who legit need assistance)
I'm as well, and I have actually written online voting software, albeit only to the likes of union elections, where the stakes are not so high.
Our team speculated in designing a secure online voting system for general elections. We came to the conclusion that it was in fact theoretically possible, but it was so convoluted that it violated one of the most sacred rules of free elections: It was not transparent for Jane/Joe Public.
I have since then been a staunch promotor of paper, pencil and a ballot box.
I am a system architect computer guy, specializing in designing and building very large scale, secure software systems.
No software should be used in elections or voting. Picture ID, clean voter rolls, secure paper ballots, hand counted. Using these low-tech solutions is not going backwards. It is making the system immune to any type of remote hacking.
Maybe full hand count is not feasible. Supposedly the UK figured out how to hand-count their BREXIT referendum, so it might be possible. I'd rather throw a few B$ at the problem than deal with what we've got right now.
I guess the most important thing is to keep the hardware and process as simple as possible, to eliminate the complexity and black boxes that can be compromised, and to give the best shot at being able to verify it. Having standard hardware that has well defined functions and never gets updated, would also help. I'm thinking standardized on a fairly simple, bulletproof scanner unit, with open published designs, firmware, etc.
Openly publishing high quality ballot scans (showing handwriting artifacts, etc) would itself go a long way to securing the process, since anyone online can vet it on their own time. If a problem can be observed there then you delve into an audit.
I don't think it's strictly true that quantum can crack any encryption. (One time pad for example). It can definitely crack many forms of encryption though. But I think my position is that faking "real life" so well that a good investigator can't catch it, is very hard.
As well as a receipt I WANT A RECEIPT for my vote with a time and date, we get a receipt for everything else why not a vote?