Partly re-translated from https://www.anti-spiegel.ru/2022/mit-hilfe-der-gruenen-die-usa-planen-die-zerstoerung-der-deutschen-wirtschaft/

Allegedly a document provided by Rand Corporation on 1/25/22

"Confidential

Distribution: WHCS, ANSA, State Department, CIA, NSA, DNC

Summary

Weakening Germany, Strengthening the U.S. The current state of the U.S. economy does not suggest that it can function without outside financial and material support. The quantitative easing policies that the Fed has regularly resorted to in recent years, as well as the uncontrolled issuance of cash during the 2020 and 2021 Covid lockdowns, have led to a sharp increase in external debt and an increase in the supply of dollars.

The continued deterioration of the economy will most likely result in a loss of the Democratic Party's position in Congress and the Senate in the upcoming November 2022 elections. Impeachment proceedings against the President cannot be ruled out under these circumstances and must be avoided at all costs.

There is an urgent need for resources to flow into the national economy, especially the banking system. Only European countries bound by EU and NATO commitments will be able to provide these without significant military and political costs to us.

The main obstacle to this is Germany's growing independence. Although it is still a country with limited sovereignty, it has been moving consistently for decades toward lifting those limitations and becoming a fully independent state. This movement has been slow and cautious, but steady. Extrapolation shows that the ultimate goal may not be reached for several decades. However, if social and economic problems in the United States escalate, the pace could accelerate significantly.

Another factor contributing to Germany's economic independence is Brexit. With the United Kingdom's exit from EU structures, we have lost an important opportunity to influence the negotiation of cross-governmental decisions.

It is the fear of our negative reaction that, by and large, determines the relatively slow pace of these changes. If we leave Europe one day, there is a good chance for Germany and France to reach full political consensus. Then Italy and other countries of old Europe - especially the former ECSC members - could join it under certain conditions. Great Britain, which is not currently a member of the European Union, will not be able to withstand the pressure of the Franco-German duo alone. If this scenario occurs, Europe will become not only an economic but also a political competitor of the United States.

Moreover, if the United States is beset by domestic problems for some time, Old Europe will be able to resist more effectively the influence of the American-oriented Eastern European countries.

Weaknesses in the German and EU economies. An increase in the flow of resources from Europe to the U.S. can be expected if Germany enters a controlled economic crisis. The pace of economic development in the EU depends almost alternatively on the state of the German economy. It is Germany that bears the brunt of spending on the poorer EU members.

The current German economic model is based on two pillars. These are unlimited access to cheap Russian energy resources and to cheap French electricity, thanks to the operation of nuclear power plants. The importance of the first factor is much higher. An interruption in Russian supplies may well trigger a systemic crisis that would be devastating for the German economy and, indirectly, for the entire European Union.

The French energy sector could also soon run into major problems. The foreseeable cessation of Russian-controlled nuclear fuel supplies, combined with the unstable situation in the Sahel, would place the French energy sector in a critical dependence on Australian and Canadian fuels. In the context of the creation of AUCUS, new opportunities arise to exert pressure. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this report.

(Translator's note: I see this issue often in analysts' articles at the moment, because Russia controls almost 50 percent of the global market for reactor fuel rods, which is why analysts are discussing the question of how French and U.S. nuclear power plants will run in the future if Russia stops exporting. In this context, the developments in Mali, which are currently making headlines, are important, because there it is not at all about the fight against any terrorists, but about securing uranium supplies to France, which could be in danger with a withdrawal of German and French troops, details can be found here. Therefore, AUKUS is very important because the new alliance is another instrument of power for the U.S. to extend its influence to Australia).

A controlled crisis Due to coalition constraints, the German leadership has not fully controlled the situation in the country. Thanks to our precise actions, it was possible to prevent the commissioning of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline despite the resistance of lobbyists from the steel and chemical industries. However, the dramatic deterioration of living standards could make the German leadership rethink its policy and return to the idea of European sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

The only viable way to guarantee Germany's rejection of Russian energy supplies is to engage both sides in the military conflict in Ukraine. Our continued actions in that country will inevitably lead to a Russian military response. The Russians, of course, will not be able to leave unanswered the massive pressure of the Ukrainian army on the unrecognized Donbass republics. This would make it possible to declare Russia the aggressor and apply the entire package of previously prepared sanctions against the country. (Translator's note: The fact that the sanctions had been prepared long in advance was publicly stated by Chancellor Scholz several times later.)

Putin, for his part, could decide to impose limited counter-sanctions - especially against Russian energy supplies to Europe. So the damage to EU countries will be quite comparable to that to the Russians, and in some countries - especially Germany - it will be higher.

The precondition for Germany to fall into this trap is the leading role of the Green parties and ideology in Europe. The German Greens are a strongly dogmatic, if not zealous, movement, which makes it quite easy to get them to ignore economic arguments. In this respect, the German Greens outperform their counterparts in the rest of Europe. Personal characteristics and the lack of professionalism of their leaders - most notably Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck - suggest that it is almost impossible for them to admit their own mistakes in time.

Thus, it will be enough to quickly shape the media image of Putin's aggressive war to turn the Greens into ardent and hard-line advocates of sanctions, a "party of war." In this way, the sanctions regime can be introduced without obstacles. The lack of professionalism of the current leaders will not allow any pushback in the future, even if the negative effects of the chosen policy become clear enough. The partners in the German governing coalition will simply have to follow their allies - at least until the burden of economic problems is greater than the fear of provoking a government crisis.

But even if the SPD and FDP are willing to stand up to the Greens, the next government's ability to normalize relations with Russia quickly enough will be noticeably limited. Germany's involvement in large-scale arms and weapons deliveries to the Ukrainian army will inevitably create a strong sense of mistrust in Russia, which will make the negotiation process rather protracted.

If war crimes and Russian aggression against Ukraine are confirmed, the German political leadership will not be able to overcome the veto of its EU partners against aid to Ukraine and tightened sanctions packages. This will ensure a sufficiently long gap in cooperation between Germany and Russia, which will render large German economic enterprises uncompetitive.

Expected consequences A reduction in Russian energy supplies - ideally a complete halt to these supplies - would have disastrous consequences for German industry. The need to divert significant amounts of Russian gas to heat homes and public facilities in winter will further exacerbate shortages. Shutdowns of industrial companies will lead to bottlenecks in components and spare parts for production, the collapse of logistics chains and ultimately to a domino effect. In the largest plants in the chemical, metallurgical and mechanical engineering industries, a complete shutdown is likely, as they have virtually no spare capacity to reduce energy consumption. This could lead to the closure of continuous cycle companies, which would mean their destruction. (Translator's note: This applies to the steel industry, for example, because once a furnace is completely shut down, it is destroyed. Furnaces must always be operated at a minimum load).

The cumulative losses to the German economy can only be estimated approximately. Even if the restriction of Russian supplies is limited to 2022, the consequences will last for several years, and the total losses could reach 200 to 300 billion euros. This will not only deal a devastating blow to the German economy, but the entire EU economy will inevitably collapse. We are not talking about a decline in economic growth here, but a prolonged recession and a decline in GDP in material production alone of three to four percent per year over the next five to six years. Such a decline will inevitably lead to panic in the financial markets and possibly cause them to collapse.

The euro will inevitably and most likely fall irrevocably below the dollar. Consequently, a sharp decline in the euro will result in its global sale. It will become a toxic currency and all countries of the world will rapidly reduce its share in their foreign exchange reserves. This gap will be filled primarily with dollars and yuan.

Another inevitable consequence of a prolonged economic recession will be a sharp decline in living standards and rising unemployment (up to 200,000 to 400,000 in Germany alone), resulting in an exodus of skilled workers and well-educated young people. There are literally no destinations for such migration today other than the United States. A somewhat smaller, but also not insignificant, flow of migrants can be expected from other EU countries.

Thus, the scenario under study will contribute both indirectly and quite directly to the strengthening of the national financial position. In the short term, it will reverse the trend of the looming economic recession and, moreover, consolidate American society by distracting it from immediate economic concerns. This, in turn, will reduce electoral risk.

Over the medium term (4-5 years), the cumulative benefits of capital flight, realigned logistical flows, and reduced competition in key industries could amount to seven to nine trillion dollars.

Unfortunately, China is also likely to benefit from this evolving scenario in the medium term. At the same time, Europe's strong political dependence on the U.S. allows us to effectively neutralize possible attempts by individual European countries to move closer to China."