when FTX's new CEO and liquidator, John Ray III, who also oversaw the unwinding and liquidation of Enron, admits that "Never in my career have I seen such a complete failure of corporate controls and such a complete absence of trustworthy financial information as occurred here."

And just in case his shock at FTX's fraud of epic proportions was not quite clear enough, he adds that "from compromised systems integrity and faulty regulatory oversight abroad, to the concentration of control in the hands of a very small group of inexperienced, unsophisticated and potentially compromised individuals, this situation is unprecedented."

According to Ray, he has located “only a fraction” of the digital assets of the FTX Group that they hope recover during the Chapter 11 bankruptcy. They’ve so far secured about $740 million of cryptocurrency in offline cold wallets, a storage method designed to prevent hacks. This is just a fraction of the $10-$50 billion in liabilities the company disclosed in its bankruptcy filing.

How do we know it's a fraud: as Ray writes on page 24, although the investigation has only begun and must run its course, it is my view based on the information obtained to date, "that many of the employees of the FTX Group, including some of its senior executives, were not aware of the shortfalls or potential commingling of digital assets." Many maybe not, but some - and certainly SBF himself - did.

It gets better: Ray said that company’s audited financial statements should not be trusted, Ray said, adding that liquidators are working to rebuild balance sheets for FTX entities from the bottom up.

FTX “did not maintain centralized control of its cash” and failed to keep an accurate list of bank accounts and account signatories, or pay sufficient attention to the creditworthiness of banking partners, according to Ray. Advisers don’t yet know how much cash FTX Group had when it filed for bankruptcy, but has found about $560 million attributable to various FTX entities so far.

Corporate funds were also used to buy homes and other personal items for employees and advisers, sometimes in their personal names.

"In the Bahamas, I understand that corporate funds of the FTX Group were used to purchase homes and other personal items for employees and advisors. I understand that there does not appear to be documentation for certain of these transactions as loans, and that certain real estate was recorded in the personal name of these employees and advisors on the records of the Bahamas," Ray said, who also noted that the company didn't have appropriate corporate governance and never held board meetings. There was no accurate list of bank accounts and account signatories, as well as insufficient attention paid to the creditworthiness of banking partners.

Ray said the company did not have “an accurate list” of its own bank accounts, or even a complete record of the people who worked for FTX (see below). He added that FTX used “an unsecured group email account” to manage the security keys for its digital assets.

The filing sheds light on the sloppy business practices, such as FTX employees asking to be paid through an online "chat" platform "where a disparate group of supervisors approved disbursements by responding with personalized emojis."