This morning I had an awesome text exchange with my band of “awake-brothers”. It was too interesting not to share. Here is the Cliffs notes version: Over the last several months our guy Tucker C has been firing massive red-pills about all the shit no one else in “main-stream media” will. Ukraine, Vaccine fukery, China, Biden crime shit, … you name it. Its almost as if he has been TRYING to get fired. He interviews MUSK, then TRUMP! Same week. WHO DOES THAT??? The absolute King of the Truth Tellers. Sure enough, FIRED (or maybe more appropriately phyzered). Now, the single most popular “News” personality is a ‘Free Agent’ (sort of). OK, so he likely has a non-compete clause if some kind. As some have pointed out here, “social media” does not likely fall into that non-grata (I wish I could recall which genius anon here pointed that out … fuk. Credit to you fren, not me). NOW, TC is rearming his red-pill artillery cannon on Twitter. Remember people clowning Elon about over paying for Twitter? When Tucker, OKeefe, and all the REAL journos are reporting fromTwitter, with HUNDREDS of millions across the globe ‘tuning in’, what kind of value would Twitter then have? What would it be valued at FINANCIALLY, with that kind of Ad reach? Elon could take Twitter 2.0 public (make it a publicly traded company again) and in less than 48 hours get back 3 times what he paid for it.
Enjoy your daily thought grenade. 🤣
U.S. Supreme Court Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) Marsh v. Alabama
No. 114
Argued December 6, 1945
Decided January 7, 1946
326 U.S. 501
Read More Opinions Opinions & Dissents U.S. Supreme Court Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) Marsh v. Alabama No. 114 Argued December 6, 1945 Decided January 7, 1946 326 U.S. 501 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ALABAMA
Syllabus
A state can not, consistently with the freedom of religion and the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, impose criminal punishment on a person for distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a company-owned town contrary to regulations of the town's management, where the town and its shopping district are freely accessible to and freely used by the public in general, even though the punishment is attempted under a state statute making it a crime for anyone to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so. Pp. 326 U. S. 502, 326 U. S. 505. Page 326 U. S. 502
Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses a town, the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free. P. 326 U. S. 507.
People living in company-owned towns are free citizens of their State and country, just as residents of municipalities, and there is no more reason for depriving them of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen. P. 326 U. S. 508.
21 So. 2d 558, reversed.
APPEAL from the affirmance of a conviction for violation of a state statute challenged as invalid under the Federal Constitution. The State Supreme Court denied certiorari, 246 Ala. 539, 21 So. 2d 564.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we are asked to decide whether a State, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town's management. The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw, is owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Except for that, it has all the characteristics of any other American town. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant, and a "business block" on which business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman. Merchants and service establishments have rented the stores and business places on the business block, and
Page 326 U. S. 503
the United States uses one of the places as a post office, from which six carriers deliver mail to the people of Chickasaw and the adjacent area. The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which cannot be distinguished from the Gulf property by anyone not familiar with the property lines, are thickly settled, and, according to all indications, the residents use the business block as their regular shopping center. To do so, they now, as they have for many years, make use of a company-owned paved street and sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in order to enter and leave the stores and the post office. Intersecting company-owned roads at each end of the business block lead into a four-lane public highway which runs parallel to the business block at a distance of thirty feet. There is nothing to stop highway traffic from coming onto the business block, and, upon arrival, a traveler may make free use of the facilities available there. In short, the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general, and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/326/501/