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Gen Flynn lied in Trump 1.0 admin. Gen. Kellogg talked about Flynn in his book.

From the book:

Mike was behind closed doors, so I asked the executive officer who was with him. He said, “The FBI,” and, almost simultaneously, the door opened and two FBI agents walked out. I would later recognize one of them as the infamous Peter Strzok. After they had gone, I asked Mike what that was all about.

He said, “Just some transition things. Nothing to worry about.”

“I should have been in here with you. If anyone knew what we did in the transition it was me.”

“Really, it was nothing.”

“Maybe so, but it doesn’t seem right that they should be here on our second workday. Next time, you should have the NSC lawyer with you.”

Months later, when I was questioned for almost five hours by Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s team, I found that Flynn’s discussions with the FBI were far more consequential than I had imagined.

Later on in the chapter:

Reince returned to my office in about an hour and said Mike had departed the complex. He added that Mike had been removed, ultimately, because he had lied to Vice President Pence. Mike had told him that he had not talked to the Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the transition about lifting Obama-era sanctions when, in fact, he had. Vice President Pence had been asked on a Sunday news show about any such conversations between administration officials and the Russians. He denied any contact, based on what Flynn had told him. Not good.

The FBI visit to Flynn two weeks earlier now loomed large in my mind. That, and the fact that Flynn had not told Reince, the White House counsel, the president, or the vice president about it until much later. That was a monumental error, and I could only assume that Flynn had lied to Pence because he had been spooked by that FBI visit. I thought, too, about Bannon’s comment during the transition that he wasn’t convinced that Flynn was the right person to be national security adviser or that K.T. McFarland was the right deputy. Perhaps he thought they were too naïve about the bureaucratic battles to come.

Another chapter mentioning Flynn:

All we needed to do was tell the truth. (That was the mistake Mike Flynn had made—he let them intimidate him into lying.) To me, and to the president, the questions were in many ways irrelevant. He knew, as I did, that this was pure political harassment, and the best strategy was full cooperation, which the White House provided to the investigators.

In the end, the Mueller team employed nineteen lawyers and forty-five FBI agents to interview more than five hundred people. They issued 2,800 subpoenas and almost 500 search warrants. The White House provided 1.4 million documents and never once exerted executive privilege. The investigation took 675 days and cost $25 million. It was a truly colossal waste of time and money. Worse, it enflamed the media’s hysteria and conspiracy mongering; it fed the worst instincts of the president’s opponents; it did incalculable damage to the public’s trust; and it impeded good governance by its very nature. It was a distraction that did not go unnoticed by foreign governments. The Mueller Report conceded that, “The investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.”