The clearance required for a nuclear submariner is Secret. Even the reactor operators are only required to have a Secret clearance. The only people with TS-SCI would be in the intelligence field (Crypto Technicians and associated fields), Communications and networking fields (Information Technicians, formerly Radiomen) and Officers with a need for highly classified intelligence, which would be most Line Officers). Even with the Clearance granted up to SCI level, the information is not available to them unless they are a part of the program or have a legitimate need to know. They have to be read in to each particular program and sign an NDA for each and every SCI program (every single person with access to TS SCI intel is recorded, the list is typically not very long for TS SCI). Regular Top Secret is not controlled as strictly, however it is still tightly controlled and access is restricted to people with a need-to-know only. Regular Secret information is more available and can be more easily accessed, however it is usually not terribly critical and by itself cannot cause significant harm to personnel or assets. This being said, the collection of a large amount of associated Secret intel can be more damaging because it can imply more comprehensive plans/networks/capabilities. The current Ukraine situation (i.e. status) would not be a critical collection of intel, however it would not be broadcast across the entire SIPR network. You would need to seek out the information online (highly encrypted and restricted network)from a SIPR terminal. This type of research raises flags if you are not in a position that would require such information. An ANG E-3 would be flagged on the network accessing this information. There is no chance the accessing of this data would have gone unnoticed. If there were printed documents in the SCIF about all this information, it would have been locked up in a safe or secure filing cabinet. The point is; there are some serious problems with this entire scenario.