Mostly correct. The supposed sales objective was that the 737 MAX was supposed to be identical in handling with the 737 New Generation (NG), so as to preclude the necessity for special training. Just move over from one plane to the other. Why would MCAS training be needed, if they have the same handling? This is a case where the customers believed the vendor.
The engine mounting moved the C.G. slightly forward, but the real problem was when the plane started to mount an angle of attack, the sidewise area of the engine nacelles acted like forward aerodynamic surfaces, wanting to push the nose up. If left uncontrolled, this would result in a stall and loss of lift. The idea behind MCAS was that it would insert a nose-down pitch moment via the horizontal stabilizer. What they didn't reckon was that the application would occur again...and again...and again...cumulatively. Overriding the pilots' control inputs.
Bad Boeing oversight (as in...no oversight?) was the main culprit. Coders do exactly what you tell them to. They are not aerodynamicists and they have no insight into the correctness of the algorithms. I am not happy with programming outsourcing, but I think it is not fair to blame the coders. The problem was above their pay grade.
Mostly correct. The supposed sales objective was that the 737 MAX was supposed to be identical in handling with the 737 New Generation (NG), so as to preclude the necessity for special training. Just move over from one plane to the other. Why would MCAS training be needed, if they have the same handling? This is a case where the customers believed the vendor.
The engine mounting moved the C.G. slightly forward, but the real problem was when the plane started to mount an angle of attack, the sidewise area of the engine nacelles acted like forward aerodynamic surfaces, wanting to push the nose up. If left uncontrolled, this would result in a stall and loss of lift. The idea behind MCAS was that it would insert a nose-down pitch moment via the horizontal stabilizer. What they didn't reckon was that the application would occur again...and again...and again...cumulatively. Overriding the pilots' control inputs.
Bad Boeing oversight (as in...no oversight?) was the main culprit. Coders do exactly what you tell them to. They are not aerodynamicists and they have no insight into the correctness of the algorithms. I am not happy with programming outsourcing, but I think it is not fair to blame the coders. The problem was above their pay grade.
They are worth blaming. But the new mantra of "we'll get it right THIS time" does not wash well with me.