Was NCAS supposed to be "bad software"? No. The whole premise is that it was good software. The badness came out in the wash, and the problem pointed straight back to the carelessness of the software requirements formulation.
Your problem is how to assure that life-saving software will result. It is not easy. And what we thought---and were assured---was a simple, harmless change in pre-existing, reliable software, turned out not to be.
To dismiss the phenomenon of bad software eventuating from what was absolutely considered good software is a bad move on your part. Very ignorant. How will you know your software is safe? And by what means? If you have no answer, then it is not a certainty the day will come. On what day will you declare your software "good," so we can measure whether it was 20 or 100 years?
This is why testing is so important in modern aerospace technology, and why it is so expensive. The human mind is still far superior to any collection of microchips.
Was NCAS supposed to be "bad software"? No. The whole premise is that it was good software. The badness came out in the wash, and the problem pointed straight back to the carelessness of the software requirements formulation.
Your problem is how to assure that life-saving software will result. It is not easy. And what we thought---and were assured---was a simple, harmless change in pre-existing, reliable software, turned out not to be.
To dismiss the phenomenon of bad software eventuating from what was absolutely considered good software is a bad move on your part. Very ignorant. How will you know your software is safe? And by what means? If you have no answer, then it is not a certainty the day will come. On what day will you declare your software "good," so we can measure whether it was 20 or 100 years?
This is why testing is so important in modern aerospace technology, and why it is so expensive. The human mind is still far superior to any collection of microchips.