Remember the original discussion of radio guidance and the REASON it was discontinued in favor of inertial guidance? I can't help it if you are not paying attention.
Its funny to watch you explode whenever you get cornered. Yeah I remember eactly what the REASON you said they discontinued it in favor of inerial guidance. Here lemme refresh your memory:
Scenario 2 is impossible. We do not provide the ability to disarm after launch for exactly the reason you want to exploit: vulnerability to electronic warfare. (The earliest ICBMs had radio command guidance, but that was replaced in the next generation by inertial guidance.)
Vulnerability to electronic warface is NOT a policy choice.
I have infinite patience. Lets keep going until you fess up.
Here you are pettifogging. The choice was made for strategic reasons. Strategy in military affairs is policy, having nothing to do with technical preference. In other words, we do not now employ radio guidance as a matter of high level (i.e., policy) choice. You can't get around that fact. It has nothing to do with technical feasibility (you have no idea what to do when the booster has burned out, so you have a time window of maybe 120-150 seconds).
We have come to an end, since you have decided to abandon intellectual honesty for narrow parsing of words (what makes "policy" different from "strategy"?). The impossibility arises from a decision NEVER to allow a path into the system once launched. Your idea that it is "possible" is a fantasy. In the case in question, it would have to be a proven fact, not a "possibility."
I worked with people who were on B-52, Minuteman, SRAM, and ALCM programs. You can take it from me and learn something, or turn your back on reality and stay in fantasy land. It seems you have done so.
Haha, now you are trying to equate "policy" and "strategy" just because you want to run away from owning up to your false statements that.
You dont seem to understand the difference between policy, strategy and technical feasibility. No wonder you are having such a hard time trying to keep your own words in order. I will make it easy for you because I honestly feel sorry to see you thrashing around so badly.
Policy
Agreement about what objectives to focus on, decided by a group of people, politically. In this discussion the policy in question is "Nuclear Deterant Policy" - to disallow countries to call each others' bluff and launch nuclear missiles knowing they can be aborted. You didn't bring it up, I offered it to you as a plausible point of argument you could have used but you decided to rewrite history and claim you did use it. Hardly pertinent to this discussion, but love how you squirm around trying to hang on to this claim.
Strategy
The best plan to use to achieve a given policy, from amongst the set of technincall feasible plans.
In this discuassion using inertial guidance system instead of a radio guidance system is a better strategy, NOT because of the nuclear deterrant policy but because of security since radio guidance is prone to ECW. This has always been your claim, and you confuse this claim with both policy and technical feasibility.
Using Inertial Guidance System DOES NOT mean Abort Sequence is no longer technologically feasible
Technical Feasibility
The set of plans that are possible to be implemented, based on physical, technological, budgetary and time constraints, each with its own pros and cons.
There are a hundred different ways you can implement Abort Sequence even with Inertial Guidance System. A very simple solution would be an encrypted destruction signal (usually called DALCode) with encryption.
Inertial Guidance already has receivers for receiving GPS signals. They need to have an additional receiver to receive the DALCode. DALCode would be transmitted via satelliets.
Once the DALCode is received, decrypted and verified, a number of courses of actions can be taken. The easiest is to explode the missile while it is still high in its trajectory. There is roughly 20-30 minutes for all these shenanigans, more than enough for a precipice since emergency alert systems can be activated to ensure everyone's attention is on the event.
The only logical argument is that, due to the nuclear deterrant policy such an abort sequence would not have been implemented in the ICBMs, not because its not technically feasible (as you keep claming) but because of the policy.
My counter-argument to this is that, just like every other system we use, there are optics and there is reality. Almost all systems have backdoors programmed into them that even most of the engineers on the team are unaware. A couple years ago I would not have believed this is possible but we are seeing it all with our own eyes. So there is no reason why the same is not plausible for missile systems as well.
And yes, even before you say it, you were on the team and you know its not there. Yeah, you not being aware of it is not the same as it not being there, no matter what your roles in the project was.
You can take it from me and learn something, or turn your back on reality and stay in fantasy land.
I am not foolish enough to take anything from anyone due to their professed expertise. I continued debating with you hoping I could gather something of value from you (against my better judgement since your claims have been proven wrong spectacularly in the past), but ultimately nothing of value materialized.
I said you were pettifogging, and you still are. In military matters strategy and policy are the same thing: determinations at a top level as to how matters are going to go. It is a policy of assuring that once launched, our weapons CANNOT be turned back (excepting maybe bombers). It is also equivalent strategy. You can't separate the two.
There was never any question of technical feasibility since we had already developed the radio command guidance method and deployed it with the first generation of Atlas missiles. That would be effective only during boost phase when the missile was within line of sight. Destruction signals are used for training flights and are operational only during boost phase. Any other embodiment (beyond line of sight) would have incurred huge technical problems.
You invoke more wishful thinking by saying you can get an abort code from satellites. Satellites to whom our uplink may be disrupted by EMP events? Satellites whose ability to receive, decipher, and retransmit the signal may be likewise compromised, or them destroyed by acts of war? Similar problems in communicating with what?---the RV or the post-boost vehicle? If the PBV, you have a time window of a few minutes...and do you want it to have a beacon, and thereby advertise its nature and location? Same thing with the RV...how do you find it, to direct a signal? Or do you broadcast a signal and let the enemy know you are aborting an attack? No, for you, the policy is thrown out the window altogether and it doesn't matter if the system is secure from cyberattack.
And here is where you display your inability to read closely. I have, from the first, maintained that what you propose is impossible because of a strategic policy decision, not because it was innately impossible technically. (This does not preclude it from being technically impossible practically.)
You don't have a counter-argument. It is only wishful thinking. There is no reason to unravel a long-standing strategic policy, and certainly no evidence for it (like test shots, and announcement of any change to our strategic posture).
Before this conversation, you had no idea why the idea was a non-starter. And now you know. But you set aside knowledge for wishful thinking...not that you know anything otherwise, but that you insist that I don't know everything. Of course, if I did, I couldn't say anything about it could I? So, you really don't know what I know or don't know, because I do know how to keep a secret. Chew on that, but don't expect your scenario to happen.
Remember the original discussion of radio guidance and the REASON it was discontinued in favor of inertial guidance? I can't help it if you are not paying attention.
Its funny to watch you explode whenever you get cornered. Yeah I remember eactly what the REASON you said they discontinued it in favor of inerial guidance. Here lemme refresh your memory:
Vulnerability to electronic warface is NOT a policy choice.
I have infinite patience. Lets keep going until you fess up.
Here you are pettifogging. The choice was made for strategic reasons. Strategy in military affairs is policy, having nothing to do with technical preference. In other words, we do not now employ radio guidance as a matter of high level (i.e., policy) choice. You can't get around that fact. It has nothing to do with technical feasibility (you have no idea what to do when the booster has burned out, so you have a time window of maybe 120-150 seconds).
We have come to an end, since you have decided to abandon intellectual honesty for narrow parsing of words (what makes "policy" different from "strategy"?). The impossibility arises from a decision NEVER to allow a path into the system once launched. Your idea that it is "possible" is a fantasy. In the case in question, it would have to be a proven fact, not a "possibility."
I worked with people who were on B-52, Minuteman, SRAM, and ALCM programs. You can take it from me and learn something, or turn your back on reality and stay in fantasy land. It seems you have done so.
Haha, now you are trying to equate "policy" and "strategy" just because you want to run away from owning up to your false statements that.
You dont seem to understand the difference between policy, strategy and technical feasibility. No wonder you are having such a hard time trying to keep your own words in order. I will make it easy for you because I honestly feel sorry to see you thrashing around so badly.
Policy
Agreement about what objectives to focus on, decided by a group of people, politically. In this discussion the policy in question is "Nuclear Deterant Policy" - to disallow countries to call each others' bluff and launch nuclear missiles knowing they can be aborted. You didn't bring it up, I offered it to you as a plausible point of argument you could have used but you decided to rewrite history and claim you did use it. Hardly pertinent to this discussion, but love how you squirm around trying to hang on to this claim.
Strategy
The best plan to use to achieve a given policy, from amongst the set of technincall feasible plans.
In this discuassion using inertial guidance system instead of a radio guidance system is a better strategy, NOT because of the nuclear deterrant policy but because of security since radio guidance is prone to ECW. This has always been your claim, and you confuse this claim with both policy and technical feasibility.
Using Inertial Guidance System DOES NOT mean Abort Sequence is no longer technologically feasible
Technical Feasibility
The set of plans that are possible to be implemented, based on physical, technological, budgetary and time constraints, each with its own pros and cons.
There are a hundred different ways you can implement Abort Sequence even with Inertial Guidance System. A very simple solution would be an encrypted destruction signal (usually called DALCode) with encryption.
Inertial Guidance already has receivers for receiving GPS signals. They need to have an additional receiver to receive the DALCode. DALCode would be transmitted via satelliets.
Once the DALCode is received, decrypted and verified, a number of courses of actions can be taken. The easiest is to explode the missile while it is still high in its trajectory. There is roughly 20-30 minutes for all these shenanigans, more than enough for a precipice since emergency alert systems can be activated to ensure everyone's attention is on the event.
The only logical argument is that, due to the nuclear deterrant policy such an abort sequence would not have been implemented in the ICBMs, not because its not technically feasible (as you keep claming) but because of the policy.
My counter-argument to this is that, just like every other system we use, there are optics and there is reality. Almost all systems have backdoors programmed into them that even most of the engineers on the team are unaware. A couple years ago I would not have believed this is possible but we are seeing it all with our own eyes. So there is no reason why the same is not plausible for missile systems as well.
And yes, even before you say it, you were on the team and you know its not there. Yeah, you not being aware of it is not the same as it not being there, no matter what your roles in the project was.
I am not foolish enough to take anything from anyone due to their professed expertise. I continued debating with you hoping I could gather something of value from you (against my better judgement since your claims have been proven wrong spectacularly in the past), but ultimately nothing of value materialized.
I said you were pettifogging, and you still are. In military matters strategy and policy are the same thing: determinations at a top level as to how matters are going to go. It is a policy of assuring that once launched, our weapons CANNOT be turned back (excepting maybe bombers). It is also equivalent strategy. You can't separate the two.
There was never any question of technical feasibility since we had already developed the radio command guidance method and deployed it with the first generation of Atlas missiles. That would be effective only during boost phase when the missile was within line of sight. Destruction signals are used for training flights and are operational only during boost phase. Any other embodiment (beyond line of sight) would have incurred huge technical problems.
You invoke more wishful thinking by saying you can get an abort code from satellites. Satellites to whom our uplink may be disrupted by EMP events? Satellites whose ability to receive, decipher, and retransmit the signal may be likewise compromised, or them destroyed by acts of war? Similar problems in communicating with what?---the RV or the post-boost vehicle? If the PBV, you have a time window of a few minutes...and do you want it to have a beacon, and thereby advertise its nature and location? Same thing with the RV...how do you find it, to direct a signal? Or do you broadcast a signal and let the enemy know you are aborting an attack? No, for you, the policy is thrown out the window altogether and it doesn't matter if the system is secure from cyberattack.
And here is where you display your inability to read closely. I have, from the first, maintained that what you propose is impossible because of a strategic policy decision, not because it was innately impossible technically. (This does not preclude it from being technically impossible practically.)
You don't have a counter-argument. It is only wishful thinking. There is no reason to unravel a long-standing strategic policy, and certainly no evidence for it (like test shots, and announcement of any change to our strategic posture).
Before this conversation, you had no idea why the idea was a non-starter. And now you know. But you set aside knowledge for wishful thinking...not that you know anything otherwise, but that you insist that I don't know everything. Of course, if I did, I couldn't say anything about it could I? So, you really don't know what I know or don't know, because I do know how to keep a secret. Chew on that, but don't expect your scenario to happen.