https://qalerts.app/?q=%23%233882

Tim Pool:

I love that how they tried using fake news against Trump and then Trump turned it around against them.

Kash Patel:

It was brilliant. It was part of the counterintel operation we ran for the past five years. I wanted Joe Biden to go and spend a half million dollars to come up with that "Ultra MAGA". Then I was going to have President Trump release my book, "The Plot Against The King" on Truth Social the very next day. And we have had the most successful book launch in...

https://youtu.be/gSMUFW5Z8QY?t=5163 (timestamp)

page 21

The Information Contest: The flow of information (intelligence and influence) is as important to insurgents as it is to counterinsurgents. A COIN campaign should seek to limit the intelligence available to the insurgents through use of counterintelligence, deception and where possible their physical separation from the populace. Similarly, the ability of the insurgents to exert influence should be restricted by physical separation and by the preemption and timely countering of their messages

Influence activities (actions and messages) can be proactive or reactive. Being proactive gives a significant influence advantage, since the first impression or report of an event that reaches a population will often receive the widest exposure and will subsequently be most resistant to alternative accounts. The insurgents that are most effective in this field design whole operations to support their influence themes. Successful COIN requires an approach to influence which is similarly proactive, entrepreneurial and prolific in ‘selling’ messages.

That said, the imperative to counter insurgent messages demands a reactive element to our influence activities. Speed is of the essence. The longer it takes for a rebuttal, denial or counter-message to be released, the less relevant and effective it will be. Cumulatively, whichever protagonist (insurgent or counter- insurgent) is fastest at processing the cycle of messaging will have a significant advantage in gaining influence. Some of the counterinsurgents’ delay in response will be derived from the need to investigate events and establish facts (a constraint from which insurgents are often exempt), though a holding response is generally preferable to silence. Less justifiable is the delay inherent in lengthy approvals processes.

The time sensitivity of reactive influence requires counterinsurgents to employ delegation of authority, universal understanding of the narrative and a degree of risk-tolerance throughout the command chain. This has strong parallels to the military concept of the OODA loop (Observe – Orient – Decide – Act) and the theory of the mission oriented approach.

https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf

Tim Pool:

I can't believe they did the "Ultra MAGA" thing. They said that the data shows middle American, like suburban people don't like MAGA and so that's why they're going for it. But it just shows they never understood the MAGA people, the Trump supporters, the right. Trump got memed into office. People were posting jokes. They were having a laugh. They were having a good time. You ever see that picture where Trump is on a tank? Its like a golden tank or something, standing there, there's like an eagle flying. It all funny, it just like supposed to be crazy. Or Trump's face as Rocky Balboa with like a ripped body and everything. And they think its real. They're like, "These Trump people are in a cult." No, they're joking.

https://youtu.be/gSMUFW5Z8QY?t=5163 (timestamp same as above)

page 14

COIN differs from other civil-military operations both in the methods employed and in the purpose of the undertaking. The purpose of COIN is to build popular support for a government while suppressing or co-opting insurgent movements.

page 18

To be effective, officials involved in COIN campaigns must address two imperatives —political action and security operations—with equal urgency, recognizing that insurgency is fundamentally an armed political competition and that effective security operations, though unlikely to deliver success by themselves, will almost always be a prerequisite to political resolution. Security operations, conducted in support of a political strategy, coordinated with economic development activity and integrated with an information campaign, will provide human security to the population and improve the political and economic situation at the local level. This should increase society’s acceptance of the government and, in turn, popular support for the COIN campaign. COIN functions therefore include informational, security, political and economic components, all of which are designed to support the overall objective of establishing and consolidating control over the environment, then transferring it to effective and legitimate local authorities.

https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf

Time stamp start full segment of Tim Pool / Kash Patel discussion about Truth Social

https://youtu.be/gSMUFW5Z8QY?t=4403