You are just dreaming up a very complex system to do something that is not desired at a policy and strategic level. You simply introduce more uncertainties into the total mission. For example, one way of hacking GPS would be to modify the signal code to include a timing error. That would throw off the accuracy to an indeterminable amount, and a dumb PBV or RV would not know what to believe, GPS or its own inertial system.
As for the discontinuance of radio guidance, it was done as a matter of policy (no vulnerability to ECM). I explained that. You have a hard time believing it.
You don't have any arguments for the present existence of any such capability. You admit you are only talking about your (uninformed) belief. Since what you are hoping for would exist only in some other reality where we would not have a policy against it, you will have a very long wait.
I'm not bothering to itemize anything. When someone has an inability to stick to a main point, the alternative is to wander all over the map. The only thing left is to quibble over punctuation.
You think your rhetorical maneuvers will get my goat and expose my "wrong." It doesn't work that way. I've worked in the environment of strategic delivery systems---B-52, Minuteman, SRAM, ALCM---and helped design kinetic energy weapons to intercept them after launch, as well as directed energy weapons to do other things. I've breathed this stuff for decades. You don't know how it works (or doesn't work) and you think you can teach me about "possibility." It seems I can't teach you about reality, more's the pity.
At the beginning I explained that replacement of radio guidance with inertial navigation was a decision based on the desire not to be subject to electronic warfare (or hacking).
As for the discontinuance of radio guidance, it was done as a matter of policy (no vulnerability to ECM).
It is possible you are hosting two personalities! (I mean that in a good natured joking way, but seriously dude, keep it together. You make it too easy, kek)
You don't seem to understand that "policy" is involved in many levels of organization. They are otherwise understood as "groundrules," decisions on principles or constraints that are established at a level that governs all subsidiary decisions. I have consistently said that the decision to change guidance methods was on such a basis. If you want to twirl around the parsing of whether this is "strategy" or "policy," be advised that it is both.
You are either dense or intentionally gaslighting me. The policy we were discussing was "nuclear deterrent policy" which makes the world beliueve that once a missile is launched it cannot be stopped, hence avoiding countries playing chicken.
You are not trying to equate it to the "policy" of "no vulnerability to ECM" which is actually just a technical strategy and nothing to do with the nuclear deterrent policy.
To make it even more understandable to you, you can have a scenario WITHOUT the nuclear deterrent policy and YET have the strategy of "no vulnerability to ECM" because you have realised that the enemy has been upgrading their ECM capabilities.
So they are completely different things. Its one thing to say "policy" and "strategy" are one and the same, and I can let it slide to account for the ignorance, but now trying to equate everything that can be tagged with the word "policy" in some way are all one and the same - thats just next level of stupidity.
No gaslight. You are doing just fine, dreaming up stuff. The strategy I was discussing was how to conduct nuclear war. You have now dragged in the notion of "deterrence," to which I can only repeat the saying of my mentor in the strategic defense business: "Deterrence works...until it doesn't." If deterrence does not work, you are left with the strategy of nuclear combat. And part of that is strategic defense. Deterrence no longer applies to a scenario where it fails, and you have to launch ICBMs, etc.
A technical strategy would be which, of several ways to do something, would be the "best" way...according to strictly technical performance measures. An operational strategy would be to rule out certain technical options as being characteristically unable to fulfill an operational requirement. That was the case in deciding to abandon radio command guidance (which worked just fine) for inertial guidance. Why allow any exterior signal into the system?
You are straining hard to separate alcohol and water. Just give it up. The amusing thing about all this is that if your fantasy came true and we had the putative ability to abort an ICBM flight, you run the interesting risk that it would not work. Reliability is an important operational characteristic. Are you aware that we typically assign two weapons to a strategic target, against the event that one weapon failed to reach it? So, your idea of a "precipice" entails a betting game that you can hit the "off" switch and that it would work.
I will make it easy for you since you have a very hard time with logic and reasoning.
Your position that it is impossible for nuclear missiles of any kind to have an abort feature is not a tenable position.
I do understand that what you are struggling to say is "Based on everything available publicly, and personal experience, I find it extremely improbable that it is the case"
For which I would have replied: "Fair enough. But we are living in improbable times and so for me this makes a good theory. Perhaps a variation that does not actually involve missiles flying in the air, but bringing the world to the brink of a nuclear war is more probably, but personally I think at the precipice we will atleat hear the news that missiles are on their way to destroy us. No hard feelings if your own beliefs stops you from even theoratically discussing it. Thats the best part about living in a free world!"
For future reference, when you try to make a point based on your personal experience that you cannot share the details fully is as useful to another person as someone claiming they can see the future in a crystal ball. Try to make your points with logic and reasoning, because "trust me bro" is not a valid reasoning.
Don't be absurd. I have said it is an impossibility from a doctrinal (another word for strategic policy) point of view. No one is going to implement such a feature. This has been doctrine for 60 years and there is nothing to suggest it will ever change---because it is not arbitrary. There are supremely life-and-death reasons for it being the way it is. You don't understand that. You don't want to understand that. You want to think it is a matter of "probability"? You literally don't know what you are talking about.
What makes you think we will hear "the news that missiles are on the way to destroy us"? Can you disseminate the news in 30 minutes to a whole nation, while you have your hands full trying to cope with the immediate military situation? That is about how much time we would have from launch to impact. Unless we had a well-developed and well-trained civil defense response, there would be little point in spreading such news. There would be no safety for anyone to find in 30 minutes...or they would already be outside the blast and radiation effects. You are an example of someone who gets his ideas about nuclear war from sensationalist movies. (The short timeline of a space-based boost-phase-intercept system made it mandatory, in our estimation, to provide a default autonomous activation capability. It's like a fire extinguishing system: it is supposed to activate when there is a fire, not wait for someone to turn it on. When you have maybe an engagement window of a few hundred seconds, you can't afford for the duty officer to track down and wake up the Colonel in command. And then you have to provide a system battle management solution for the intercept of maybe a thousand missiles in that time frame. We found one. Rather clever, and very simple. This is by way of illustrating the nature of the strategic combat problem.)
I have never made any points on information that is not openly available. I have merely shown you that you cannot estimate what I know or do not know, since I am not discussing classified information. All my points are based on history and doctrine that has been in place for a very long time, across multiple strategic weapon systems. You don't have any basis for suggesting or expecting that there is anything to overturn this situation---or, more importantly, that it has changed to support your fantasy.
You are just dreaming up a very complex system to do something that is not desired at a policy and strategic level. You simply introduce more uncertainties into the total mission. For example, one way of hacking GPS would be to modify the signal code to include a timing error. That would throw off the accuracy to an indeterminable amount, and a dumb PBV or RV would not know what to believe, GPS or its own inertial system.
As for the discontinuance of radio guidance, it was done as a matter of policy (no vulnerability to ECM). I explained that. You have a hard time believing it.
You don't have any arguments for the present existence of any such capability. You admit you are only talking about your (uninformed) belief. Since what you are hoping for would exist only in some other reality where we would not have a policy against it, you will have a very long wait.
I'm not bothering to itemize anything. When someone has an inability to stick to a main point, the alternative is to wander all over the map. The only thing left is to quibble over punctuation.
You think your rhetorical maneuvers will get my goat and expose my "wrong." It doesn't work that way. I've worked in the environment of strategic delivery systems---B-52, Minuteman, SRAM, ALCM---and helped design kinetic energy weapons to intercept them after launch, as well as directed energy weapons to do other things. I've breathed this stuff for decades. You don't know how it works (or doesn't work) and you think you can teach me about "possibility." It seems I can't teach you about reality, more's the pity.
You said this:
You also said this:
It is possible you are hosting two personalities! (I mean that in a good natured joking way, but seriously dude, keep it together. You make it too easy, kek)
You don't seem to understand that "policy" is involved in many levels of organization. They are otherwise understood as "groundrules," decisions on principles or constraints that are established at a level that governs all subsidiary decisions. I have consistently said that the decision to change guidance methods was on such a basis. If you want to twirl around the parsing of whether this is "strategy" or "policy," be advised that it is both.
You are either dense or intentionally gaslighting me. The policy we were discussing was "nuclear deterrent policy" which makes the world beliueve that once a missile is launched it cannot be stopped, hence avoiding countries playing chicken.
You are not trying to equate it to the "policy" of "no vulnerability to ECM" which is actually just a technical strategy and nothing to do with the nuclear deterrent policy.
To make it even more understandable to you, you can have a scenario WITHOUT the nuclear deterrent policy and YET have the strategy of "no vulnerability to ECM" because you have realised that the enemy has been upgrading their ECM capabilities.
So they are completely different things. Its one thing to say "policy" and "strategy" are one and the same, and I can let it slide to account for the ignorance, but now trying to equate everything that can be tagged with the word "policy" in some way are all one and the same - thats just next level of stupidity.
No gaslight. You are doing just fine, dreaming up stuff. The strategy I was discussing was how to conduct nuclear war. You have now dragged in the notion of "deterrence," to which I can only repeat the saying of my mentor in the strategic defense business: "Deterrence works...until it doesn't." If deterrence does not work, you are left with the strategy of nuclear combat. And part of that is strategic defense. Deterrence no longer applies to a scenario where it fails, and you have to launch ICBMs, etc.
A technical strategy would be which, of several ways to do something, would be the "best" way...according to strictly technical performance measures. An operational strategy would be to rule out certain technical options as being characteristically unable to fulfill an operational requirement. That was the case in deciding to abandon radio command guidance (which worked just fine) for inertial guidance. Why allow any exterior signal into the system?
You are straining hard to separate alcohol and water. Just give it up. The amusing thing about all this is that if your fantasy came true and we had the putative ability to abort an ICBM flight, you run the interesting risk that it would not work. Reliability is an important operational characteristic. Are you aware that we typically assign two weapons to a strategic target, against the event that one weapon failed to reach it? So, your idea of a "precipice" entails a betting game that you can hit the "off" switch and that it would work.
I will make it easy for you since you have a very hard time with logic and reasoning.
Your position that it is impossible for nuclear missiles of any kind to have an abort feature is not a tenable position.
I do understand that what you are struggling to say is "Based on everything available publicly, and personal experience, I find it extremely improbable that it is the case"
For which I would have replied: "Fair enough. But we are living in improbable times and so for me this makes a good theory. Perhaps a variation that does not actually involve missiles flying in the air, but bringing the world to the brink of a nuclear war is more probably, but personally I think at the precipice we will atleat hear the news that missiles are on their way to destroy us. No hard feelings if your own beliefs stops you from even theoratically discussing it. Thats the best part about living in a free world!"
For future reference, when you try to make a point based on your personal experience that you cannot share the details fully is as useful to another person as someone claiming they can see the future in a crystal ball. Try to make your points with logic and reasoning, because "trust me bro" is not a valid reasoning.
Don't be absurd. I have said it is an impossibility from a doctrinal (another word for strategic policy) point of view. No one is going to implement such a feature. This has been doctrine for 60 years and there is nothing to suggest it will ever change---because it is not arbitrary. There are supremely life-and-death reasons for it being the way it is. You don't understand that. You don't want to understand that. You want to think it is a matter of "probability"? You literally don't know what you are talking about.
What makes you think we will hear "the news that missiles are on the way to destroy us"? Can you disseminate the news in 30 minutes to a whole nation, while you have your hands full trying to cope with the immediate military situation? That is about how much time we would have from launch to impact. Unless we had a well-developed and well-trained civil defense response, there would be little point in spreading such news. There would be no safety for anyone to find in 30 minutes...or they would already be outside the blast and radiation effects. You are an example of someone who gets his ideas about nuclear war from sensationalist movies. (The short timeline of a space-based boost-phase-intercept system made it mandatory, in our estimation, to provide a default autonomous activation capability. It's like a fire extinguishing system: it is supposed to activate when there is a fire, not wait for someone to turn it on. When you have maybe an engagement window of a few hundred seconds, you can't afford for the duty officer to track down and wake up the Colonel in command. And then you have to provide a system battle management solution for the intercept of maybe a thousand missiles in that time frame. We found one. Rather clever, and very simple. This is by way of illustrating the nature of the strategic combat problem.)
I have never made any points on information that is not openly available. I have merely shown you that you cannot estimate what I know or do not know, since I am not discussing classified information. All my points are based on history and doctrine that has been in place for a very long time, across multiple strategic weapon systems. You don't have any basis for suggesting or expecting that there is anything to overturn this situation---or, more importantly, that it has changed to support your fantasy.