At the beginning I explained that replacement of radio guidance with inertial navigation was a decision based on the desire not to be subject to electronic warfare (or hacking).
As for the discontinuance of radio guidance, it was done as a matter of policy (no vulnerability to ECM).
It is possible you are hosting two personalities! (I mean that in a good natured joking way, but seriously dude, keep it together. You make it too easy, kek)
You don't seem to understand that "policy" is involved in many levels of organization. They are otherwise understood as "groundrules," decisions on principles or constraints that are established at a level that governs all subsidiary decisions. I have consistently said that the decision to change guidance methods was on such a basis. If you want to twirl around the parsing of whether this is "strategy" or "policy," be advised that it is both.
You are either dense or intentionally gaslighting me. The policy we were discussing was "nuclear deterrent policy" which makes the world beliueve that once a missile is launched it cannot be stopped, hence avoiding countries playing chicken.
You are not trying to equate it to the "policy" of "no vulnerability to ECM" which is actually just a technical strategy and nothing to do with the nuclear deterrent policy.
To make it even more understandable to you, you can have a scenario WITHOUT the nuclear deterrent policy and YET have the strategy of "no vulnerability to ECM" because you have realised that the enemy has been upgrading their ECM capabilities.
So they are completely different things. Its one thing to say "policy" and "strategy" are one and the same, and I can let it slide to account for the ignorance, but now trying to equate everything that can be tagged with the word "policy" in some way are all one and the same - thats just next level of stupidity.
No gaslight. You are doing just fine, dreaming up stuff. The strategy I was discussing was how to conduct nuclear war. You have now dragged in the notion of "deterrence," to which I can only repeat the saying of my mentor in the strategic defense business: "Deterrence works...until it doesn't." If deterrence does not work, you are left with the strategy of nuclear combat. And part of that is strategic defense. Deterrence no longer applies to a scenario where it fails, and you have to launch ICBMs, etc.
A technical strategy would be which, of several ways to do something, would be the "best" way...according to strictly technical performance measures. An operational strategy would be to rule out certain technical options as being characteristically unable to fulfill an operational requirement. That was the case in deciding to abandon radio command guidance (which worked just fine) for inertial guidance. Why allow any exterior signal into the system?
You are straining hard to separate alcohol and water. Just give it up. The amusing thing about all this is that if your fantasy came true and we had the putative ability to abort an ICBM flight, you run the interesting risk that it would not work. Reliability is an important operational characteristic. Are you aware that we typically assign two weapons to a strategic target, against the event that one weapon failed to reach it? So, your idea of a "precipice" entails a betting game that you can hit the "off" switch and that it would work.
You said this:
You also said this:
It is possible you are hosting two personalities! (I mean that in a good natured joking way, but seriously dude, keep it together. You make it too easy, kek)
You don't seem to understand that "policy" is involved in many levels of organization. They are otherwise understood as "groundrules," decisions on principles or constraints that are established at a level that governs all subsidiary decisions. I have consistently said that the decision to change guidance methods was on such a basis. If you want to twirl around the parsing of whether this is "strategy" or "policy," be advised that it is both.
You are either dense or intentionally gaslighting me. The policy we were discussing was "nuclear deterrent policy" which makes the world beliueve that once a missile is launched it cannot be stopped, hence avoiding countries playing chicken.
You are not trying to equate it to the "policy" of "no vulnerability to ECM" which is actually just a technical strategy and nothing to do with the nuclear deterrent policy.
To make it even more understandable to you, you can have a scenario WITHOUT the nuclear deterrent policy and YET have the strategy of "no vulnerability to ECM" because you have realised that the enemy has been upgrading their ECM capabilities.
So they are completely different things. Its one thing to say "policy" and "strategy" are one and the same, and I can let it slide to account for the ignorance, but now trying to equate everything that can be tagged with the word "policy" in some way are all one and the same - thats just next level of stupidity.
No gaslight. You are doing just fine, dreaming up stuff. The strategy I was discussing was how to conduct nuclear war. You have now dragged in the notion of "deterrence," to which I can only repeat the saying of my mentor in the strategic defense business: "Deterrence works...until it doesn't." If deterrence does not work, you are left with the strategy of nuclear combat. And part of that is strategic defense. Deterrence no longer applies to a scenario where it fails, and you have to launch ICBMs, etc.
A technical strategy would be which, of several ways to do something, would be the "best" way...according to strictly technical performance measures. An operational strategy would be to rule out certain technical options as being characteristically unable to fulfill an operational requirement. That was the case in deciding to abandon radio command guidance (which worked just fine) for inertial guidance. Why allow any exterior signal into the system?
You are straining hard to separate alcohol and water. Just give it up. The amusing thing about all this is that if your fantasy came true and we had the putative ability to abort an ICBM flight, you run the interesting risk that it would not work. Reliability is an important operational characteristic. Are you aware that we typically assign two weapons to a strategic target, against the event that one weapon failed to reach it? So, your idea of a "precipice" entails a betting game that you can hit the "off" switch and that it would work.