All you have repeatedly argued so far is about guidance systems used on ICBM, but nothing to do with abort mechanisms that are independant of the guidance system. To put in simple words, arguments you have provided do not prove the impossibility of aborting a missile after launch, only impossibility to implement an certain abort mechanism that relies on the guidance system.
Hence my comment about thinking outside the box. It does not mean coming up with some extremely clever design. It just means thinking outside the limitations you have imposed on your own thinking.
A better argument would have been the official narrative that missiles do not have abort mechanisms as a nuclear deterrant policy. I could accept that as a valid argument and counter that with "optics is not the same as reality".
However you decided to make your point by proving the technological impossibility of implementing an abort mechanism. Proving impossibility has a higher bar of proof, and requires you to exhaust all possible avenues, not just a single avenue.
Dream on. There are all kinds of provisions to prevent a nuke going off if it isn't supposed to. But there is a clear path to it going off if it is meant to, and that is by design. Why do you suppose they run psych tests on the airmen in the ICBM control capsules, who would be the ones to initiate the launch signal? To screen out those who would go rogue? No. To detect those who would funk out and not perform their duty.
When would this abort take place? During boost, or during coast? What is your assurance that it would work? Or that it wouldn't be hacked? You would just be introducing unreliability and vulnerability into the system.
These are not limitations of design (though you would have to overcome physics to communicate from a sub to a missile). They are requirements of combat strategy, to which all design must be subordinated. I have pointed out this is a policy choice ("a nuclear deterrent policy") and you just don't want to accept it. I have informed you---insistence on your part after this point is nothing but childish retreat into the fantasy of "it's possible."
Lots of things are "possible." Like moving Mt. Everest to Australia, one teaspoon at a time. Possible, but not bloody likely, for reasons of motivation and practicality. Same thing here. Nobody wants it. It would just impair the reliability of the system to do the job it is supposed to do. Hopium is nice, but when you are overdosed it can convert to Dopium.
When they decided to forego radio guidance for inertial guidance. There was never any thought of providing an abort feature for the operational systems. It was not a technical choice; radio guidance worked just fine. It was a decision based on the vulnerability of the system to interrupt. Does that spell it out for you?
All you have repeatedly argued so far is about guidance systems used on ICBM, but nothing to do with abort mechanisms that are independant of the guidance system. To put in simple words, arguments you have provided do not prove the impossibility of aborting a missile after launch, only impossibility to implement an certain abort mechanism that relies on the guidance system.
Hence my comment about thinking outside the box. It does not mean coming up with some extremely clever design. It just means thinking outside the limitations you have imposed on your own thinking.
A better argument would have been the official narrative that missiles do not have abort mechanisms as a nuclear deterrant policy. I could accept that as a valid argument and counter that with "optics is not the same as reality".
However you decided to make your point by proving the technological impossibility of implementing an abort mechanism. Proving impossibility has a higher bar of proof, and requires you to exhaust all possible avenues, not just a single avenue.
Dream on. There are all kinds of provisions to prevent a nuke going off if it isn't supposed to. But there is a clear path to it going off if it is meant to, and that is by design. Why do you suppose they run psych tests on the airmen in the ICBM control capsules, who would be the ones to initiate the launch signal? To screen out those who would go rogue? No. To detect those who would funk out and not perform their duty.
When would this abort take place? During boost, or during coast? What is your assurance that it would work? Or that it wouldn't be hacked? You would just be introducing unreliability and vulnerability into the system.
These are not limitations of design (though you would have to overcome physics to communicate from a sub to a missile). They are requirements of combat strategy, to which all design must be subordinated. I have pointed out this is a policy choice ("a nuclear deterrent policy") and you just don't want to accept it. I have informed you---insistence on your part after this point is nothing but childish retreat into the fantasy of "it's possible."
Lots of things are "possible." Like moving Mt. Everest to Australia, one teaspoon at a time. Possible, but not bloody likely, for reasons of motivation and practicality. Same thing here. Nobody wants it. It would just impair the reliability of the system to do the job it is supposed to do. Hopium is nice, but when you are overdosed it can convert to Dopium.
Everything you write here boils down to "Its impossible because its impossible"
Really? I am sure I missed it, so I will wait for you to point me where in this conversation you brought up the policy choice.
We will continue after you do that.
When they decided to forego radio guidance for inertial guidance. There was never any thought of providing an abort feature for the operational systems. It was not a technical choice; radio guidance worked just fine. It was a decision based on the vulnerability of the system to interrupt. Does that spell it out for you?