Now that is false. I have elaborated at length, and provided specific reasons and information that ruined some of your fancies. You have no basis for refutation, so you just withdraw into Know-Nothing-ism and denounce me for having expertise. You stopped arguing when you had nothing to say to my last comments---that was you, not me.
If this comes down to the lack of a means to abort a nuclear shot, then there we are. You come from the school of thought that you can pull a trigger and shoot a bullet at someone---but you can change your mind in the slender time available and just "turn it off." The early developers of ICBMs saw that radio command guidance (which would only prevail near the launch site) was too "open" for mission continuation, so they told the bullet to do what it had to do and be blind and deaf to anything else after the match was lit. (Radio command guidance was ruled out for the SLBMs because submarines don't surface to conduct a launch and seawater shuts off radio signals of the kind that would be needed. We used to have intercontinental cruise missiles, but they had similar reliance on inertial guidance (which was partly their weakness, because the gyro drift over the flight time resulted in too much error).
These are facts. Facts that are known to those who have studied the subject, thus a manifestation of "expertise." It is fatal to your conceit. You don't like being informed of this and take the attitude of "Well, it can be otherwise," which is only wishful thinking. And so you lay it all down at my feet for being poison to reasoned debate, when all I am doing is educating you. When the teacher tells you that Madagasgar is east of Africa, are you going to denounce his/her expertise, or blink and learn something?
All you have repeatedly argued so far is about guidance systems used on ICBM, but nothing to do with abort mechanisms that are independant of the guidance system. To put in simple words, arguments you have provided do not prove the impossibility of aborting a missile after launch, only impossibility to implement an certain abort mechanism that relies on the guidance system.
Hence my comment about thinking outside the box. It does not mean coming up with some extremely clever design. It just means thinking outside the limitations you have imposed on your own thinking.
A better argument would have been the official narrative that missiles do not have abort mechanisms as a nuclear deterrant policy. I could accept that as a valid argument and counter that with "optics is not the same as reality".
However you decided to make your point by proving the technological impossibility of implementing an abort mechanism. Proving impossibility has a higher bar of proof, and requires you to exhaust all possible avenues, not just a single avenue.
Dream on. There are all kinds of provisions to prevent a nuke going off if it isn't supposed to. But there is a clear path to it going off if it is meant to, and that is by design. Why do you suppose they run psych tests on the airmen in the ICBM control capsules, who would be the ones to initiate the launch signal? To screen out those who would go rogue? No. To detect those who would funk out and not perform their duty.
When would this abort take place? During boost, or during coast? What is your assurance that it would work? Or that it wouldn't be hacked? You would just be introducing unreliability and vulnerability into the system.
These are not limitations of design (though you would have to overcome physics to communicate from a sub to a missile). They are requirements of combat strategy, to which all design must be subordinated. I have pointed out this is a policy choice ("a nuclear deterrent policy") and you just don't want to accept it. I have informed you---insistence on your part after this point is nothing but childish retreat into the fantasy of "it's possible."
Lots of things are "possible." Like moving Mt. Everest to Australia, one teaspoon at a time. Possible, but not bloody likely, for reasons of motivation and practicality. Same thing here. Nobody wants it. It would just impair the reliability of the system to do the job it is supposed to do. Hopium is nice, but when you are overdosed it can convert to Dopium.
When they decided to forego radio guidance for inertial guidance. There was never any thought of providing an abort feature for the operational systems. It was not a technical choice; radio guidance worked just fine. It was a decision based on the vulnerability of the system to interrupt. Does that spell it out for you?
Now that is false. I have elaborated at length, and provided specific reasons and information that ruined some of your fancies. You have no basis for refutation, so you just withdraw into Know-Nothing-ism and denounce me for having expertise. You stopped arguing when you had nothing to say to my last comments---that was you, not me.
If this comes down to the lack of a means to abort a nuclear shot, then there we are. You come from the school of thought that you can pull a trigger and shoot a bullet at someone---but you can change your mind in the slender time available and just "turn it off." The early developers of ICBMs saw that radio command guidance (which would only prevail near the launch site) was too "open" for mission continuation, so they told the bullet to do what it had to do and be blind and deaf to anything else after the match was lit. (Radio command guidance was ruled out for the SLBMs because submarines don't surface to conduct a launch and seawater shuts off radio signals of the kind that would be needed. We used to have intercontinental cruise missiles, but they had similar reliance on inertial guidance (which was partly their weakness, because the gyro drift over the flight time resulted in too much error).
These are facts. Facts that are known to those who have studied the subject, thus a manifestation of "expertise." It is fatal to your conceit. You don't like being informed of this and take the attitude of "Well, it can be otherwise," which is only wishful thinking. And so you lay it all down at my feet for being poison to reasoned debate, when all I am doing is educating you. When the teacher tells you that Madagasgar is east of Africa, are you going to denounce his/her expertise, or blink and learn something?
All you have repeatedly argued so far is about guidance systems used on ICBM, but nothing to do with abort mechanisms that are independant of the guidance system. To put in simple words, arguments you have provided do not prove the impossibility of aborting a missile after launch, only impossibility to implement an certain abort mechanism that relies on the guidance system.
Hence my comment about thinking outside the box. It does not mean coming up with some extremely clever design. It just means thinking outside the limitations you have imposed on your own thinking.
A better argument would have been the official narrative that missiles do not have abort mechanisms as a nuclear deterrant policy. I could accept that as a valid argument and counter that with "optics is not the same as reality".
However you decided to make your point by proving the technological impossibility of implementing an abort mechanism. Proving impossibility has a higher bar of proof, and requires you to exhaust all possible avenues, not just a single avenue.
Dream on. There are all kinds of provisions to prevent a nuke going off if it isn't supposed to. But there is a clear path to it going off if it is meant to, and that is by design. Why do you suppose they run psych tests on the airmen in the ICBM control capsules, who would be the ones to initiate the launch signal? To screen out those who would go rogue? No. To detect those who would funk out and not perform their duty.
When would this abort take place? During boost, or during coast? What is your assurance that it would work? Or that it wouldn't be hacked? You would just be introducing unreliability and vulnerability into the system.
These are not limitations of design (though you would have to overcome physics to communicate from a sub to a missile). They are requirements of combat strategy, to which all design must be subordinated. I have pointed out this is a policy choice ("a nuclear deterrent policy") and you just don't want to accept it. I have informed you---insistence on your part after this point is nothing but childish retreat into the fantasy of "it's possible."
Lots of things are "possible." Like moving Mt. Everest to Australia, one teaspoon at a time. Possible, but not bloody likely, for reasons of motivation and practicality. Same thing here. Nobody wants it. It would just impair the reliability of the system to do the job it is supposed to do. Hopium is nice, but when you are overdosed it can convert to Dopium.
Everything you write here boils down to "Its impossible because its impossible"
Really? I am sure I missed it, so I will wait for you to point me where in this conversation you brought up the policy choice.
We will continue after you do that.
When they decided to forego radio guidance for inertial guidance. There was never any thought of providing an abort feature for the operational systems. It was not a technical choice; radio guidance worked just fine. It was a decision based on the vulnerability of the system to interrupt. Does that spell it out for you?